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INTRODUCTION

The United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) faces a
massive and growing backlog of patent applications.' The PTO
cannot seem to increase its staffing fast enough to keep up with an
explosion of applications, especially given problems with examiner
morale and retention.2
At the same time, the PTO struggles to improve examination
quality.3 A decade or more of criticism pushed the agency to start
experimenting with new examination methods.4 One experiment,
called the "second pair of eyes" review, required a second examiner
to review an application that had been allowed by the original
examiner. 5 The experiment was introduced in 2000 to improve the
quality of certain kinds of business method patents.6 A Federal
Trade Commission report praised this program and endorsed its
expansion.7 The difficulty, of course, is that a second look at a patent
application absorbs examiner time that could instead be used to
address the application backlog.
1. See generally Hiring Efforts Are Not Sufficient To Reduce the Patent Application
Backlog: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Courts,the Internet, and Intellectual Property of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Robin M. Nazzaro, Director,
Natural Resources and Environment), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08527t.
pdf. Jaffe and Lerner note that the number of applications per examiner is growing in recent
years and is much higher than the ratio at the European Patent Office, ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH
LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 131 (2004), but Wagner notes the ratio is actually
lower than the ratio in Japan, R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent Quality Mechanisms
25 (Jan. 6, 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/bd/workshops/ipmarketplacelaprl7/docs/rwagner2.pdf.
2. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 1, at 1 n.1.

4. See, e.g., id. at 10.
5. See Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Announces Action Plan
Targeted To Improve Quality and Respond to Customer Needs for Biotech Patent Applications
(Oct. 6, 2003), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/03-26.htm. The
PTO's second pair of eyes program was expanded as part of the agency's Patent Quality
Improvement program, which is part of its 21st Century Strategic Plan. See United States
Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Quality Improvement: Expansion of the Second Pair-ofEyes Review, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/action/q3p17a.htm (last visited
Oct. 21, 2009).
6. See Patent Quality Improvement, supra note 5.
7. See FED. TRADE COMM., TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAw AND POLICY ch. 6, at 19-20 (2003), availableat http://www.ftc.
gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
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Mark Lemley vividly commented on the resource constraint
facing the PTO and its implications for patent quality.' He noted
that patent examiners devote an average of eighteen hours to each
patent they examine.9 This compares unfavorably to what I expect
of my students when they write research memos. Eighteen hours
certainly is not much time, and thus, we should not be surprised if
low quality patents sometimes issue.
Lemley defended "rational ignorance" at the PTO and argued
against investing heavily in more examination hours as a method
of improving patent quality. 10 Few patents are ever asserted,
licensed, or litigated." Thus, it would be bad policy to exert much
2
effort to perfect the bulk of patents because they go unused.
Lemley contended the better choice is to continue the current
practice of a relatively cursory review and save a more resourceintensive review for litigation, if and when litigation arises. 3
The PTO has tentatively embraced two other paths out of this
dilemma: shift some examination responsibilities to other parties,
and stem the explosion of patent applications. In 2007 the agency
initiated Community Patent Review, also known as the Peer to
Patent program. a The goal of this experiment is to improve the
quality of technical information available to patent examiners by
enlisting volunteers to search for and share relevant "prior art" with
examiners. 5 Prior art is patent jargon that refers to patents,
8. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495
(2001); see also F. Scott Kieff, The Case for RegisteringPatents and the Law and Economics
of Present Patent-ObtainingRules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 70-72 (2003) (proposing a model that
would lower the scrutiny level the PTO gives to an application); Robert P. Merges, As Many
as Six Impossible PatentsBefore Breakfast: PropertyRights for Business Concepts and Patent
System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 590 (1999) (stating that the volume of patent
applications causes low quality examination).
9. See Lemley, supra note 8, at 1500; Merges, supra note 8, at 602 (observing that "[i]n
theory" there is approximately $3000 per patent available for examination).
10. Lemley, supra note 8, at 1496, 1510-11.
11. Id. at 1497.
12. See id.
13. Id. at 1510-11.
14. For an overview of Peer to Patent, Community Patent Review, see Peer to Patent,
Community Patent Review, http://www.peertopatent.org/getting-started (last visited Oct. 21,
2009); see also The Peer to Patent Project: Community Patent Review, http://dotank.nyls.edu/
communitypatent/about.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
15. See Peer to Patent, supra note 14.
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publications and other information that can be used to limit or
invalidate patent claims because, for example, they lack novelty or
are obvious.' 6 Commentators and patent officials are also considering outsourcing patent searches to for-profit companies and relying
more heavily on searches and other examination activities by the
Japanese and European Patent Offices.' 7 All of these programs have
potential to improve patent quality without consuming additional
examiner time.
The PTO recently proposed a complementary set of regulatory
changes that could have reduced the workload on examiners.'" One
proposed change would have limited the number of continuing
applications that an inventor could submit. 9 There is evidence that
one cause of the explosion of patent applications is a surge in the
use of a string of related "continuing" applications that are linked
through a shared disclosure contained in a single initial application.20 This regulatory change was successfully challenged on the
grounds that the reform was substantive and the PTO does not have
substantive rule-making authority.2 ' Other proposed changes would
directly or indirectly limit the set of claims contained in a patent.2 2
Reforms that successfully reduce workload could free up resources
that could be used to improve examination quality.

16. See, e.g., Trilateral, Glossary of Patent Related Terms, http://www.trilateral.net/
glossary.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
17. See, e.g., K.C. Jones, Patent Examiners Oppose Patent Reform Proposal,
INFORMATIONWEEK, Sept. 5, 2007, http://www.informationweek.comnews/mobility/show
Article.jhtml?articleID-201804307&cid=RSSfeedTechWeb (stating that patent examiners
opposed a proposed reform that would effectively outsource the patent search). The PTO, the
Japan Patent Office (JPO), and the European Patent Office (EPO) formed Trilateral to
promote cooperation between the three largest patent offices in the world. Trilateral, About
Us, http://www.trilateral.netiabout.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2009). Several projects are
underway to facilitate work-sharing. For example, Project Share aims to reduce redundancy
in search and examination by coordinating priority of applications across the three offices. See
Trilateral, Strategic Handling of Application for Rapid Examination (SHARE), http://www.
trilateral.net/projects/worksharinglshare.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
18. Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716 (Aug. 21,
2007) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
19. See Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
20. See Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Abolishing Patent Continuations,84 B.U.
L. REv. 63, 71-83 (2004).
21. See Tafas, 559 F.3d at 1352, 1359-62.
22. See id. at 1350.

2009]

PATENT EXAMINATION PRIORITIES

679

Measures that discourage excessive patenting and claiming,
propose shared examination responsibilities, and increase staffing
all have potential to raise examination quality and alleviate the
patent application backlog. So far these measures have been too
limited to have much impact, and there is insufficient evidence to
reliably judge their effectiveness. In this Article, I consider a different approach to examination reform. I take as given a significant
scarcity of examiner time, and I ask how the PTO should set
examination priorities. In other words, how much of their eighteen
they are
hours should examiners devote to the various tasks
23
issue?
to
patent
a
allowing
before
conduct
to
expected
It is vital to recognize that examiners will make mistakes given
the time constraints that they face.2'4 Thus, good patent policy
requires much thought be given to minimizing the expected social
cost from those mistakes. Part I of this Article sketches a model of
patent examination errors and explores the social costs associated
with various types of errors. The model supposes that patent
examination leads to three possible outcomes: rejection of a patent
application, allowance of a patent with narrow claims, or allowance
of a patent with broad claims. Errors arise when the examination
outcome for some reason departs from the proper outcome.
The remaining sections of the Article add complications to the
basic model. Part II considers strategies that might be used by
patent applicants in response to various choices of examination
priorities. Good examination policy must anticipate how patent
lawyers respond to examination practice. Part III discusses human
relations management within the PTO. Any employer who wants to
successfully implement a reform in an organization's core processes
needs to think carefully about how to monitor and reward employees for advancing reform-the PTO is no different in this regard.
Part IV notes that examination priorities should depend on the cost
23. About ten years ago, Rob Merges expressed his disappointment that so little attention
has been paid to this issue. Merges, supra nbte 8,at 591 ("It is curious that in all the vast
economic literature on patents, virtually nothing has been written about the functioning of
a patent office."). The literature has not moved very far since then.
24. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 1, at 172-73 ("[M]istakes [w]ill [a]lways [bie with [u]s.");
Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of Validity, 60
STAN. L. REv. 45, 61 (2007) (stating that examination errors are unavoidable because of
budgetary and informational constraints).
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of performing various examination tasks. Part V replaces the assumption of Part I that claim scope is determinate with the
assumption that claim scope is fuzzy. Finally, Part VI takes a quick
look at policy issues presented by various examination reforms.
The goal of this Article is to identify policy issues that must be
addressed by analysts who want to set examination priorities and
to help guide empirical research that will be needed to make good
policy judgments. At present, patent scholars know very little about
patent examination errors.

I. A MODEL OF PATENT EXAMINATION ERRORS
A. Introduction to the Model
Inventors who want to patent their inventions normally hire a
patent agent or attorney who drafts a patent application and
submits it to the PTO. (Hereafter, I will call the patent agent or
attorney the "prosecutor" in keeping with patent law jargon.) The
key features of a regular utility application are the written description of the invention and the claims.2 5 At a minimum, the written
description teaches people skilled in the art how to make and use
the invention.2 6 The claims articulate patent-based exclusionary
rights over the invention. Patent law commentators often speak of
a hypothetical bargain between the inventor and the public in which
the inventor discloses technical information to the public in exchange for exclusionary rights.2 7 The scope of the rights corresponds
to the quality of the disclosure; more valuable disclosures entitle the
inventor to broader claim scope.
Patent prosecution and examination is an ex parte administrative proceeding that is often described as a bargaining session.2 8
25. See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
26. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1009, 1010 (2008) ("The rationale for patenting long favored in judicial
opinion is the 'quid pro quo' theory: that patents are a bargain of sorts, between the inventor
and the public, exchanging public disclosure of the claimed invention in return for the grant
of a period of exclusive rights.").
28. ROBERT PATRICKMERGES &JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAWAND POLICY: CASES
AND MATERIALS 51 (2007).
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Initially, the prosecutor typically asks for broad rights, broader
than justified in light of the disclosure. The examiner responds
by objecting to or rejecting aspects of the application,2 9 and the
prosecutor comes back with arguments or changes to the application
that are responsive to the concerns of the examiner. ° The examiner
is supposed to serve the needs of the inventor-applicant, but also
assure that the application complies with the requirements of the
Patent Act. 3 When this bargain reaches an impasse and the
examiner will not allow the patent to issue despite arguments or
amendments by the prosecutor, then some inventors will abandon
their application, and others will appeal within the agency to the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI)."
I will model certain aspects of the prosecution and examination
process to uncover the role of various examination tasks in generating examination errors that degrade examination quality. I assume
that there are three possible outcomes of examination: no patent
issues, a patent with narrow claim scope issues, or a patent with
broad claim scope issues. For the time being I will ignore appeal and
litigation. I will assume that the standards of patentability are wellconceived, and therefore, I will speak about the proper outcome of
examination as an outcome in which an applicant gets the broadest
rights it is entitled to. Table One displays the proper outcome of an
examination in the three rows. The columns of the table display the
outcome chosen by the examiner. Naturally, there are three choices,
and thus nine entries in the table.
Correct examination outcomes fall on the diagonal where the
proper outcome and the examination outcome match. The offdiagonal entries represent different kinds of mistakes. The three
italicized entries in the southwest part of the table represent false
29. 'The refusal to grant claims because the subject matter as claimed is considered
unpatentable is called a 'rejection.' The term 'rejected' must be applied to such claims in the
examiner's action. If the form of the claim (as distinguished from its substance) is improper,
an 'objection' is made." U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINATION

AND PROCEDURE § 706.01 (rev. 2008), availableat http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/
mpep-e8rb_0700.pdf [hereinafter MPEP].
30. For example, the MPEP explains how to overcome a rejection based on a printed
patent or publication in § 706.02(b). See id. § 706.02(b).
31. See id. § 706.
32. See id. § 1201, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep-eSr5_
1200.pdf.
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negatives-the examiner should have allowed a patent to issue, but
did not, or should have allowed a broader patent. The three
underlined entries in the northeast part of the table represent false
positives-the examiner should have rejected or narrowed the
application.
Examination Errors

Exam
0Outcoome

No
Patent

Narrow
Scope

Broad
Scope

Narrow
Grant

Broad
Grant

Proper
Outcome
No
Patent
Narrow
Scope

Narrow
Rejection

Broad
Scope

Broad
Rejection

Too
Broad
Too
Narrow

Table One
I have further divided the errors in a natural fashion. Perhaps the
most egregious errors are the rejection of an application when the
proper outcome was the grant of a patent with broad scope (a kind
of false negative), and allowance of a patent with broad scope when
the proper outcome was rejection (the counterpart false positive). I
label the egregious false negative as a broad-rejection mistake and
the egregious false positive as a broad-grant mistake.
The other false negatives consist of a too-narrow mistake, when
the examiner should have allowed broader claims, and a narrowrejection mistake, when the examiner rejected narrow claims that
should have been allowed. Similarly, the other false positives consist
of a too-broad mistake, when the examiner should have insisted on
narrower claims, and a narrow-grant mistake, when the examiner
allows a patent with narrow claims to issue, 'but where the patent
should have been rejected.
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Table Two offers a numerical illustration of my account of examination errors. For purposes of illustration, I consider an interval of
time in which 100 patents are examined. In the far left column I
show that by assumption, 30 of the applications would properly be
rejected, 60 would properly receive claims with narrow scope, and
the remaining 10 would properly receive claims with broad scope. In
this illustration there are 25 false positives and 19 false negatives.
The magnitudes reflect my conjecture about what actual examination outcomes might look like, but I hasten to emphasize that this
conjecture has a tenuous connection with reality.3 3

Numerical Illustration
Exam
Outcome
ome

No
Patent

Narrow

Broad

Scope

Scope

20

8

2

15

30

15

1

3

6

Proper
Outcome
30
No
Patent
60
Narrow
Scope
10
Broad
Scope
Table Two

33. DAN L. BuRK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRIsis AND How THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT 25 (2009) (stating that the PTO manages to "reject a small but nontrivial percentage of the applications it receives and to narrow the scope of the claims in many of the
patents it does issue"); Mark Lemley & Bhaven N. Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber
Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181, 188-89 (2008) (stating that about one quarter of patent
applications filed in January 2001 were abandoned by June 2008).
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B. The Source of Errors
In theory, an analyst could populate the table above with useful
numbers if the analyst could estimate the frequency of proper
outcomes across the three possible outcomes, and if the analyst
understood why examination mistakes occur. Estimates of the
frequency of proper outcomes can possibly be derived through
surveys, case studies, cross-national comparisons of examination
outcomes, and from BPAI and litigation data. I set that project aside
for now and ask instead: What process generates examination
errors?
Examiners check patent applications to see whether they comply
with the statutory subject matter, utility, novelty, nonobviousness,
disclosure requirements, and assorted other statutory and agency
requirements. To keep life simple, I will suppose for now that
examiners make only one mistake. Let me illustrate how the six
different types of errors illustrated in the tables might arise.
As a first example, consider mistakes involving the utility or
subject matter standards. Suppose that a prosecutor submits an
application for a patent on an invention that should not be patented
because the invention lacks utility or because it is an abstract
process and therefore not proper subject matter. Suppose further
that the invention is technically significant and that the disclosure
supports broad claim scope.3 4 Correct examination would result in
no patent. An error in applying the utility or subject matter requirement would result in a broad-grant mistake. I record this sort
of error in the northeastern-most entry of Table Three.
If I simply reverse the assumption about utility/subject matter
and assume that a broad patent is proper, then a mistaken rejection
on utility or subject matter grounds causes a broad-rejection mistake as indicated in the southwestern-most entry of Table Three.
Let me put some flesh on these rather skeletal examples with the
aid of two cases addressing the subject matter requirement. In
Parker v. Flook, the applicant invented an improved process for
34. An invention that lacks utility might be technically quite impressive. The utility
requirement in patent law is not about utility, conventionally defined. Instead, the
requirement usually relates to the question of whether the inventor has actually completed
an invention or instead seeks a patent as a "hunting license" to cut off research competition
by others in a promising field of invention. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966).
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refining petroleum."5 A key feature of the process was a mathematical formula that was implemented using a computer.3" The Supreme
Court invalidated the patent on subject matter grounds and denied
the patent owner the benefit of "claims [that] cover a broad range of
potential uses of the method."3 7 In this case, the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals (CCPA) (rather than the examiner) committed
a broad-grant type of error by insisting the PTO issue this patent.
Three years later, in Diamond v. Diehr,the Supreme Court again
addressed the subject matter eligibility of a process invention
featuring software.3 " The examiner rejected claims to a method of
curing synthetic rubber on the grounds that the invention was not
patentable.3 9 The Court backtracked from Flook and upheld a broad
claim to the use of a formula (called the "Arrhenius equation") to
automate the curing process.4" Thus, the examiner committed a
broad-rejection error.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585-86 (1978).
Id.
Id. at 586, 594-96.
450 U.S. 175, 177-78 (1981).
Id. at 179-80.
Id. at 177, 190-91.

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:675

Examination Tasks
'Exam
Outcome

No
Patent

Narrow
Scope

Broad

Obviousness

Utility
Subject
Matter

Scope

Proper
Outcome
No
Patent
Narrow
Scope

Obviousness

Enablement

Broad
Scope

Table Three
Recall that for now I take as given the correctness of the two
decisions, thus labeling the decision of the CCPA in Flook and the
examiner in Diehr as errors is appropriate. The more important
point to notice is that I have described a scenario with extreme
errors. If the examiner makes a mistake, it is a broad-rejection or a
broad-grant.
Now suppose that a prosecutor submits an application for a
patent on an invention that should receive a patent with narrow
claim scope. Suppose that broader scope would not intrude on the
prior art, but it is not justified by the quality of the disclosure.
Correct examination would result in allowance of a patent with
narrow scope. An error in applying the enablement standard would
allow the inventor to get broad scope and lead to a too broad mistake, as indicated in the middle right of Table Three.4 1
Reversing my assumption about the proper scope, let me now
assume that broad scope is proper. If the examiner mistakenly
41. Instead of an enablement mistake, a novelty mistake would work well here too. If the
examiner misses some relevant prior art, he or she might allow claims that are too broad.
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rejects an application with broad claims on enablement grounds but
allows an application with narrow claims, then the result is a toonarrow mistake as indicated in the center bottom entry.
Next suppose that a prosecutor submits an application for a
patent on an invention that should not be patented because the
invention is obvious. Correct examination would result in rejection
of the application. Suppose the disclosure in the application is consistent with narrow rather than broad scope. An error in applying
the nonobviousness standard would allow the inventor to get a
patent with narrow scope. The error thus causes a narrow-grant
mistake. This is indicated in the top-center entry of Table Three.
The final case is indicated in the left-center entry. It is a narrowrejection mistake that results from mistakenly rejecting an
application on grounds of obviousness.
These stories are meant to illustrate how different types of
examination errors are likely to be generated, but certainly other
patterns are also possible. For example, an examiner might make
a subject matter mistake concerning an application that makes a
disclosure worthy of claims with a narrow scope. A false negative
would then fit into the narrow-rejection region of the tables and a
false positive would fit into the narrow-grant region.
Nevertheless, I believe the scenarios involving nonobviousness
and enablement are quite realistic. Examiners can make mistakes
when deciding whether an applicant has enabled anything at all,
but I believe that the hard examination issue is whether a broad
claim has been enabled given that a narrow claim has been
enabled.42 Thus, enablement mistakes tend to fall into the too
narrow and too broad categories rather than the narrow-reject or
narrow-grant categories. Furthermore, though it might seem surprising to nonpatent lawyers, it is possible for a narrow claim to be
nonobvious and a broader claim to be obvious. This happens when
the broader claim includes species that are "too close" to the prior
art, and the narrow claim excludes those species.4" It seems un42. Speaking about the enablement standard, Sean Seymore said, "[t]ime pressures and
the PTO's incentive system makes it nearly impossible for an Examiner to rigorously examine
a complex generic claim." Sean B. Seymore, HeightenedEnablement in the UnpredictableArts,
56 UCLA L. REV. 127, 147 (2008).
43. Patent lawyers use the word species to refer to a member of a set of technologies that
is covered by a generic claim.
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likely, though, that an examiner would mistakenly find an invention
obvious when it properly deserved a patent with broad scope. At any
rate, these are questions for future empirical research.
My last task in this Section is to consider what happens when
examiners make mistakes when applying more than one standard.
The reader should quickly see that the possibility of multiple mistakes shifts the mix of mistakes toward false negatives and away
from false positives. A patent application must comply with all of
the standards of patentability and thus a mistaken finding of
noncompliance with any standard will result in a rejection. For
example, an application that properly should get broad scope might
be granted narrow scope instead if an examiner mistakenly decided
either that broad scope was not enabled or that the broad claims did
not comply with the written description requirement.
I do not want to overstate the effect of this bias toward false
negatives. First, the ease of compliance with certain patentability
standards is likely to be negatively correlated. Notably, when an
invention is arguably obvious, it is unlikely that an applicant would
have difficulty enabling the invention." Therefore, the odds of
mistake on enablement may be low when the odds of mistake on
obviousness are high. Second, there is a powerful force arising from
the ex parte nature of examination that biases examination in the
opposite direction-toward false positives. I will discuss that bias in
Part II.
C. The Social Cost of Examination Errors
Legal scholars often seek policies that minimize the expected
social cost from legal errors. This approach is quite familiar in the
context of antitrust policy4 5 and has also been applied to patent
scholarship analyzing the standard of nonobviousness.4" Scholars
have noted its relevance to patent examination policy, but it has not
been developed in this context yet.47
44. A similar point is made in BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 33, at 61-62.
45. See, e.g., KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIc THEORY AND COMMON LAW

EVOLUTION, at xv (2003).
46. See, e.g., Michael J. Meurer & Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Carrotsand Sticks: A
Model of Nonobviousness, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 547, 548-51 (2008).
47. See Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What Do Patents Purchase? In Search of Optimal
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The easiest way to understand what kind of social costs are
generated by examination errors is to study some extreme policies.
For example, an extremely pro-patent policy would direct examiners
to issue patents unless an application clearly falls short of
patentability standards and it does not take much time to show
this. Besides avoiding false negatives, this policy would conserve
examiner time and help the PTO whittle down the application
backlog. The social cost, of course, flows from frequent false
positives-there would be many improperly granted patents. If
patent litigation were costless, and private parties could effortlessly
distinguish narrow from broad, and valid from invalid patents, then
false positives would not generate social cost-they would simply be
ignored. As these conditions do not hold, the extreme pro-patent
policy generates social cost from the successful assertion of overbroad and invalid patents, and the associated cost of litigation."
The complementary extremely antipatent policy would direct
examiners to issue patents only when an application clearly meets
the patentability standards and it does not take much time to learn
this.49 This policy would avoid false positives and conserve examiner
time, but it would also generate social cost from many false negatives. The innovation incentives and other social benefits from
patents would be significantly undercut. °
Ignorancein the Patent Office, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1219, 1246 (2004) (discussing false positives
and false negatives in patent examination); Merges, supranote 8, at 592-93 (describing social
costs of mistakes during patent examination).
48. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 120-45 (2008) (providing evidence on
the cost of patent litigation); James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Private Cost of Patent
Litigation26 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Law and Economics Working Paper Series, No. 07-08,
2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=983736.
49. There is a slight asymmetry between the pro-patent and the antipatent policy because
the examiner needs to articulate a suitable basis for rejecting an application, but not for
patent allowance. For example, the MPEP and 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 provide:
In rejecting claims for want of novelty or for obviousness, the examiner must cite
the best references at his or her command. When a reference is complex or
shows or describes inventions other than that claimed by the applicant, the
particular part relied on must be designated as nearly as practicable. The
pertinence of each reference, if not apparent, must be clearly explained and each
rejected claim specified.
37 C.F.R. § 1.104(c)(2) (2008); MPEP, supra note 29, § 706. Hence, allowance should use fewer
resources, even before we consider applicant appeals which are discussed in the next Section.
50. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 48, at 95-119 for a discussion of the value of
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I did not use my model of errors when I articulated the social
costs of errors from these first two policies. The nature of the errors
and associated social costs are clear. I developed the model because
I want to consider other kinds of examination policies that are based
on patent standards, rather than patent grant outcomes.
Consider a policy that achieves perfect examination of all standards except the nonobviousness standard codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 103."' In other words, the only examination errors arise from
improperly rejecting patents on nonobvious inventions and improperly granting patents on obvious inventions. I will assume that
when an invention presents a close question of obviousness, the
proper outcome is either no patent or a narrow patent. Thus, I
assume that it is easy for the examiner to judge that the "best
inventions" with the broadest disclosure are patentable.
Table Four illustrates the pattern of errors associated with this
policy. The numbers in this table continue the numerical illustration from Table Two. By assumption, there are no errors when
the proper scope is broad. Furthermore, when the proper scope is
narrow and when an examiner should not issue a patent, my
assumptions mean that the examiner will not mistakenly grant a
patent with broad scope. In contrast to the first two policies, the
policy illustrated in Table Four, which allows only § 103 errors, 2
generates both false positives and false negatives. It has the
desirable property of avoiding mistakes involving broad scope. I will
comment later on what demands this type of policy makes on
examination resources.

patents to their owners.
51. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006) (providing the condition for patentability of nonobvious subject
matter).
52. Id.
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15

0
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30

0

0

0

10
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Outcome
30

No
Patent
60
Narrow

Scope
10
Broad
Scope

Table Four
Consider next a policy that achieves perfect examination of all
standards except the 35 U.S.C. § 112 enablement standard;53 in
particular, I assume that examination errors arise only from mistakes concerning claim scope. The enablement doctrine polices the
hypothetical bargain between the patent applicant and society -the
grant of a patent in exchange for the disclosure of an invention.
Broad claims are permitted only if a person having ordinary skill in
the art can practice the claim without undue experimentation.54
Thus, a broad claim must be supported by a higher quality disclosure than the disclosure required for a narrower claim. Likewise, a
narrow claim is not valid unless the applicant teaches how to
practice what is claimed.
I will assume that enablement issues are usually easy to resolve
when the question is whether the applicant has enabled a narrow
claim, but it may be difficult to resolve the question of whether the
53. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
54. See, e.g., In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736-37 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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applicant has enabled a broad claim. I draw this distinction because
examination for enablement of a narrow claim often depends simply
on whether the applicant made a good disclosure of a particular
embodiment of the invention that it previously "reduced to practice"
(patent jargon that for my purpose here I will equate to "prototype").
Thus, I am assuming an examiner can easily read the disclosure of
a prototype in an application and determine whether a person
skilled in the art could make and use the prototype (and closely
related technologies) without undue experimentation. The problem
with broad claims is that patent law occasionally rewards inventors
of important inventions with claim scope that extends far beyond
any prototype actually made by the inventor. Assessment of enablement in this context is likely to be significantly more difficult.
Table Five illustrates the pattern of errors associated with this
policy. The numbers in this table continue the numerical illustration
from Tables Two and Four. By assumption, there are no errors when
the proper outcome is no patent. Furthermore, examiners do not
make a mistake by rejecting a patent application for lack of enablement when a patent should be issued. Errors are made when
examiners improperly grant broad patents to applicants who should
receive patents with narrow scope, and when examiners improperly
reject broad claims and instead grant a patent with narrow claims.
Comparison of Tables Four and Five suggests some important
questions about expected social cost from errors created by different
examination priorities.
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Section 112 Errors
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30

0

0

0

30

30

0

5

5
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Outcome
30
No
Patent
60
Narrow
Scope
10
Broad
Scope
Table Five
Two of the more difficult tasks facing examiners are determining:
(1) whether minor inventions meet the nonobviousness standard,
and (2) whether applications on patentable inventions contain
disclosures that are rich enough to satisfy the enablement requirement in relationship to broad claims in those applications. Table
Five displays the consequences of an examination policy that
avoids mistakes on the first task, and Table Four displays the consequences of an examination policy that avoids mistakes on the
second task. Both policies lead to false positives and false negatives.
The policy that permits nonobviousness errors limits mistakes to
claims with narrow scope. The policy that permits enablement
errors concentrates mistakes on claims with broad scope. If the
social cost from both types of errors is greater for broad claims, as
seems likely, then weak examination of enablement is especially
problematic. But that conclusion must be tempered by consideration
of the frequency of various types of inventions and patent applications.
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Comparing the pattern of errors reported in Tables Four and
Five, the reader should notice that Table Four displays more errors
and a higher ratio of false negatives to false positives. This pattern
arises because of the assumption that there are relatively few
inventions that properly get broad claims and the assumption that
the difficult enablement cases involve distinguishing inventions that
properly get patents with broad scope from those that get narrow
scope. Because there are relatively few cases of inventions that
properly get broad scope, there cannot be many false negatives in
which the examiner mistakenly limits an applicant to narrow scope
when it should have received a patent with broad scope. In contrast,
there are many cases of inventions that properly get patents with
narrow scope and many associated false negatives by examiners
who mistakenly judge those inventions to be obvious.55
II. STRATEGIC PROSECUTION
I have explored the role that different examination tasks play in
generating patterns of examination errors. Now I explore the effect
of strategic decisions by patent prosecutors in response to examination policies. Good examination policy must be crafted only after
careful thought about how prosecutors may strategically respond to
new policies. First, prosecutors can appeal mistakes to the BPAI
and on to the courts.5 6 Appeal patterns must be considered to judge
the final effect of examination reform on errors. Second, prosecutors
can change the mix of proper examination outcomes by changing the
content of patent applications, or changing the frequency with which
they file patent applications on problematic inventions.57 This in
turn affects the pattern of errors.
. 55. Notice that I also assumed that errors are symmetric-the tables display a 50 percent
probability of false negative and false positive error.
56. Erin M. Dunston & R. Danny Huntington, Actions: Tips for Obtainingthe Best Second
Bite at the Same Apple, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 272, 272-73 (2009).
57. See Juan Alcicer & Michelle Gittelman, Patent Citations as a Measure of Knowledge
Flows: The Influence of Examiner Citations,88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 774, 779 (2006). Prior art
search varies across industries, and this variation is probably explained mostly by strategy
choices of applicants, not intrinsic technological differences. It appears that more search is
done in pharmaceuticals and related industries and less is done in information and
communication technologies. Juan Alcicer et al., Applicant and Examiner Citations in U.S.
Patents:An Overview and Analysis, 38 RES. POL'Y 415, 417 (2009).
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Appeal of rejected patent claims is common and often successful.5"
The impact of appeal on error is obvious-prosecutors are not public
spirited enough to appeal false positives. Therefore, only false
negatives are corrected through the appeal process. If appeals were
costless and mistake-free, there would not be any false positives
emerging from the PTO.
I am not sure whether strategic patent filing, disclosure, and
claim drafting is common; it is more difficult to measure than
appeals. Patent lawyers often speak about patents as if the contents
of patent documents were dictated strictly by technology and law.
According to this view, if patents in a particular technological
classification tend to be long and have many citations and claims,
that is simply because the technology is complicated. If patents have
grown more complex over time, that is simply because technology
has grown more complicated, or maybe because courts or the PTO
have insisted on more detailed disclosures. Allison and Lemley
studied issued patents and they found that technology does explain
some of the variation in patent documents, but business considerations are also important and prosecutors do think strategically
about prosecution." 9 Bessen and Meurer developed more evidence on

58. Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA? What the Patent
System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 316-17 (2007) ("[A] patent
denial diverges from a patent grant in that it goes through significant appellate review even
before it reaches the Federal Circuit.... Notably, review by BPAI judges, who are familiar with
the relevant law and frequently have some skill in the relevant science, is far from a rubber
stamp for examiner denials. To the contrary, in fiscal year 2004, the BPAI affirmed examiner
denials in only 37.1% of cases. Moreover, even those denials that were actually reviewed by
the BPAI represent only a very select subset of all patent denials. In fiscal year 2003,
examiners from most technology classes reopened the case, or simply allowed the application,
more than 50% of the time after an appeal brief to the BPAI had been filed.") (citations
omitted).
59. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the U.S. Patent
System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 81 (2002) ("[W]e speculate on explanations for the dramatic
increase in the complexity of patents. We reject a number of possible explanations, including
both changes in the quality of PTO examination and changes in the nature of technology, as
inconsistent with the data. The hypothesis that best fits the data is that patents are
increasingly valuable to businesses, and that companies that expect to use patents in
licensing or litigation are willing to spend more time and effort in the PTO to get a better
patent."); see also John R. Allison et al., ValuablePatents,92 GEO. L.J. 435, 455 (2004) (noting
that patent applicants file more claims and cite more prior art to increase the value of their
patents in litigation).
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this point. ° We conducted some exploratory regressions that
suggest that the number of claims and the number of citations to
patent prior art are both determined in part by characteristics of the
applicant.6 We found that citations and claims are positively
correlated with the applicants' cash flow and capital intensity." We
also found that large firms, foreign firms, and firms with large
patent portfolios refine their patents less, after controlling for other
factors.63
Besides general evidence that prosecutors behave strategically,
there is one study that discusses prosecutor response to a particular
examination reform. Allison and Hunter examined the success of
the Second Pair of Eyes Review (SPER) program.' This program
was implemented because of concern about improper grants of
business method patents, and a more general concern about the
quality of these patents.6 5 The program required a second review of
business method patents after their initial allowance.66 For purposes
of this program, business method patents were defined as those
falling within Class 705 of the PTO patent classification system.6 7
Naturally enough, prosecutors were not keen to have their
applications subjected to a second review. But as the PTO controlled
the classification decision, it might seem that there was little a
prosecutor could do to avoid the program. Allison and Hunter were
not so sure. They observed that in the 1980s and early 1990s
prosecutors "strategically drafted software patents to make them
appear to be something else (such as hardware) when there was still
doubt about the patentability of software; consequently, it was
highly likely that the SPER initiative would likewise lead to
60. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for PatentPolicyfrom EmpiricalResearch
on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 20-22 (2005).
61. Id. at 21-22.
62. Id. at 21.
63. Id.
64. See John R. Allison & Starling D. Hunter, On the Feasibility of Improving Patent
Quality One Technology at a Time: The Case of Business Methods, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
729, 734 (2006).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See USPTO, Class 705 Data-Processing: Financial, Business Practice, Management,
or Cost/Price Determination, http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc705/defs
705.htm (last visited Oct 28, 2009).
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strategic drafting to avoid SPER."6 At the time of their study there
was too little data on post-SPER applications to assess the skill of
prosecutors in avoiding a 705 classification.6 9 But their data did
show that the PTO apparently was diverting applications away from
Class 705, perhaps to avoid the increased workload. v
Shifting from observed strategic behavior to hypothetical cases
will allow me to make more definite conclusions. Recall the
examination policy depicted in Table Five eliminates all examination errors except enablement mistakes that result in patents that
are too broad or too narrow. How would prosecutors respond to such
a policy? First, they would appeal improperly narrow scope, and
second, they would cut back on applications on inventions that
should not be patented. If appeals were costless and if prosecutors
could easily identify unpatentable inventions, then Table Five would
need to be revised as shown below in Table Six. The number of
applications and examinations would fall from 100 to 70. There
would be 5 appeals of false negative errors that would be corrected,
and 30 false negatives would remain (of the too broad type).

68. Allison & Hunter, supra note 64, at 786.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 760-63.
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Section 112 Errors
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Table Six
Next consider the effect of strategic prosecution on the examination policy that tolerated nonobviousness errors as depicted in Table
Four: that policy allowed only narrow-rejection and narrow-grant
mistakes. Notice that strategic prosecution does not change the
number of applications. Prosecutors have the same incentive to
submit applications for unpatentable inventions and hope for a false
positive mistake. When a false negative mistake occurs, prosecutors
will appeal and get the mistake corrected. Thus, there would be 100
applications and examinations and 30 appeals-more work for the
PTO compared to the alternative policy. Still the policy depicted in
Table Four might be socially preferred. It leads to fewer false
positives, and the false positive mistakes generate patents with
narrower scope.
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III. INCENTIVES AND MONITORING
Patent examination policy should minimize the expected social
cost of error. There are enormous gaps in our knowledge of examination and patent policy that limit our ability to formulate an effective
policy. But if we forge ahead based on our limited knowledge, the
next challenge is implementing the policy. It would be unwise to
assume that the PTO, as currently constituted, would rush to
implement an optimal examination policy.
The culture of the agency and incentives of administrators and
examiners may work against many beneficial reforms. At the outset,
one should worry about agency capture.7 1 The PTO has a close, longstanding relationship with the patent bar and with large patent
holders.72 It would not be surprising if the agency favored the
interests of these parties over general social welfare.7" The PTO has
endorsed a "customer service" orientation that stresses the importance of meeting the needs of patent applicants.7 4 This orientation
may be motivated in part by the dependence of the agency on fees
to fund its operation.7 5
If the administrators favor the reform, there is still the issue of
encouraging examiners to embrace it. A possible danger is that
examiners are so poorly motivated that they would make little or
no effort to implement a reform. I have heard no reports of such
extreme shirking; instead, it seems more likely that well-intentioned examiners may pursue their own notions of what constitutes
a good examination. Convincing empirical research indicates that
71. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 33, at 106-07 (stating that the PTO is subject to capture
by patent applicants).
72. See Wagner, supra note 1, at 19 (describing the many "repeat players" in patent law).
73. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 1, at 136-37 (noting the incentives to process patents
quickly and grant too easily); Benjamin & Rai, supra note 58, at 316 ("The current structure
of patent examination makes PTO denials sufficiently difficult that there is strong reason to
believe that false positives (patent grants that should be denials) are much more common
than false negatives (denials that should be grants)."); Wagner, supra note 1, at 2 ("[The
modern patent system affirmatively encourages low patent quality.").
74. Michael R. Taylor & Jerry Cayford, American Patent Policy, Biotechnology, and
African Agriculture: The Casefor Policy Change, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 355-56 (2004).
75. Wagner, supra note 1, at 17-19 (noting that the PTO has incentives to issue too many
patents).
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idiosyncratic features of individual examiners are important in
explaining examination outcomes.7 v Part of the variation may be
explained by differences in effort devoted to prior art search. Lemley
and Sampat obtained evidence that effort directed to prior art
search appears to decline as examiner seniority increases." Perhaps
more junior examiners exert greater search effort because they are
monitored more closely."v The generally loose monitoring and
heterogeneous approaches to examination could make it difficult to
tailor incentive schemes to promote widespread adoption of reform.7 9
Good examination practices and acceptance of reform requires
the design of appropriate incentives and monitoring, and possibly
reform of the agency's culture. Successful reform would also be
facilitated by more stable, experienced, and well trained examination corps.8 ° "A recurring theme in the assessment of PTO performance is poor examination quality due to high examiner turnover.
This boils down to two specific problems: (1) too few senior examiners; and (2) inadequate training for the revolving cast of inexperienced examiners." 1

76. lain Cockburn, Sam Kortum & Scott Stern, Are All Patent Examiners Equal?
Examiners,Patent Characteristics,and Litigation Outcomes, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWELDGEBASED ECONOMY 46-47 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) (evincing that the
identity of examiners accounts for a significant portion of the variation in characteristics of
patents and litigation outcomes); Douglas Lichtman, RethinkingProsecutionHistory Estoppel,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 151, 155 (2004) (arguing that examiners vary significantly in terms of their
propensity to induce amendments to patent claims).
77. Mark Lemley & Bhaven N. Sampat, Examiner Characteristicsand the Patent Grant
Rate 21 (Stan. Law Sch. John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 369,
2009), available at http://ssrn.comabstract=1329091.
78. Lemley and Sampat note that junior examiners are supervised by senior examiners,
but senior examiners have tenure and significant discretion with little direct monitoring. Id.
at 6.
79. Cockburn, Kortum, and Stern conclude with a warning:
While idiosyncratic behavior of examiners can be controlled to some extent by
formal processes such as supervision, selection of examiners, training,
incentives, the institution's cultural norms necessarily play an important role
in their exercise of discretion in awarding patent rights. Policy changes that
impact the organizational structure and internal culture of the USPTO should
be careful to take this into account.
Cockburn, Kortum & Stern, supra note 76, at 53.
80. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 1, at 136 (discussing retention problems at the PTO; the
turnover rate is six times as high as that in the EPO).
81. Merges, supra note 8, at 606.
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IV. EFFORT COST

Conceptually, the simplest relevant consideration when setting
examination priorities is the cost of various exam tasks, usually
measured in terms of examiner time and effort. Some kinds of
information are more readily available to patent examiners. All else
equal, examiners should pursue tasks in which they have an
advantage compared to decision makers at later stages during
appeals, interferences, reissue, reexamination, licensing, and litigation.
Incorporating effort cost into optimal examination policy is
difficult because there has been no attempt to measure these costs.
Intuition suggests certain kinds of obscure prior art that parties in
litigation can obtain is mostly hidden from examiners.8 2 In contrast,
examiners can get patent and publication based prior art at
relatively low cost.8 The scientific and engineering expertise of
examiners gives them a comparative advantage relative to lawyers
and judges in understanding patent disclosures.' On the other
hand, patent standards that require policy judgment may implicate
economic facts and theories that are not within easy reach of
examiners.8 5

V. Fuzzy BOUNDARIES
The model of Part I assumes that claim scope is clear and that it
is easy to distinguish narrow patent scope from broad patent scope.

82. For example, the use of an invention that qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. §§
102(a), 102(b), or 102(g) might be very difficult for an examiner to find. See Margo A. Bagley,
Internet Business Model Patents:Obvious by Analogy, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
253, 280 (2001).
83. See Thomas F. Cotter, Toward a Functional Definition of Publication in Copyright
Law, 92 MNN. L. REV. 1724, 1790-91 (2008).
84. Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-InstitutionalApproach to Patent
System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1068-75 (2003) (discussing the greater expertise of
the PTO in biotechnology compared to the Federal Circuit).
85. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 33, at 107, 168-69 (arguing that courts should defer to
fact-finding by the PTO, but the agency is not well suited to setting legal standards because
it does not have easy access to much relevant policy information).
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In truth, claim scope is often ambiguous. 8 When claim scope is
ambiguous and the examiner mistakenly reads the claim too
broadly, then there is a danger of improper rejection-or a false
negative.87 If the examiner reads the claim scope too narrowly,
there is a corresponding danger of improper allowance-or a false
positive. 8 Claim ambiguity disrupts examination, but it has a
varied impact on different examination tasks.8 9
Novelty examination is especially harmed by ambiguous claim
scope. Novelty analysis requires an examiner to interpret the scope
of each claim in an application. If the examiner finds any species in
the prior art that falls within the bounds of a claim, then the
examiner must reject the claim. If this sounds like infringement
analysis-it should! The basic identity test required in novelty
analysis states, 'That which infringes, if later, would anticipate, if
earlier."9
Bessen and Meurer argue that the U.S. patent system is in crisis
today because it fails to provide good patent notice.91 Courts and
lawyers have trouble determining whether a potentially infringing
technology falls inside or outside the scope of patents with ambiguous claims. Poor notice harms innovators who inadvertently infringe
others' patents and have to pay a "patent tax" on innovation.9 2
Unfortunately, a similar notice problem afflicts examiners because
novelty analysis parallels infringement analysis.
The PTO tries to alleviate the fuzzy boundaries problem through
a policy that directs examiners to give claims their broadest
reasonable interpretations.9 3 This sensible policy runs contrary to
the general tendency of the U.S. patent system to worry more about
86. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 48, at 54-62 for a discussion of the difficulty
assessing patent scope; see also Wagner, supra note 1, at 16 (arguing that patent applicants
have inadequate incentive to describe their invention or claim it clearly).
87. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 48, at 163.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S. 530, 537 (1889).
91. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 48, at 46-47.
92. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, What's Wrong with the PatentSystem? Fuzzy
Boundaries and the Patent Tax, FIRST MONDAY, June 4, 2007, http://firstmonday.orgthtbinI
cgiwraplbinojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1867/1750.
93. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316-17 (Fed. Cir. 2005); MPEP, supra note 29,
§ 2111, availableat http://www.uspto.gov/web/officeslpacmpep/mpep-e8r6_21OO.pdf.
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false negatives than false positives. An important open question is
how effective this policy is. If an examiner does not perceive the
broad reading of a claim, then the policy is ineffective.
At the other end of the spectrum from novelty, satisfaction of the
utility standard normally does not turn on interpretation of the
claims. Consider two leading utility cases in which no utility was
found. The process for making a type of steroid in Brenner v.
9 5 did not
Manson,9 4 and fragments of the maize gene in In re Fisher,
meet the utility requirement because the inventions were merely of
research interest and did not have real world application. This sort
of judgment should be possible even if the precise scope of the
claims is unclear.
The fuzzy boundaries problem sabotages novelty analysis but not
utility analysis; how does this problem affect other examination
tasks? I am not sure. Written description analysis is probably
affected severely. Written description problems usually arise when
an inventor amends a claim and changes its scope. The written
description requirement asks whether the inventor "possessed"
the invention at the time of patent application.9 6 Perhaps enablement, obviousness, and subject matter are in the middle ground.
Examination of a generic claim for enablement requires the
examiner to gauge whether disclosure in the application is commensurate to breadth of the claim. In some cases this analysis should be
feasible even if the examiner is not sure of the precise scope of the
claim. Similarly, because obviousness analysis calls for a rough
judgment, it often should not matter whether the examiner has
claim scope precisely correct. Claim construction is the first step in
subject matter analysis. This suggests potential notice trouble, but
there was no claim construction dispute in the Federal Circuit's
most recent subject matter case, In re Bilski.97

94. 383 U.S. 519, 535-36 (1966).
95. 421 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
96. See Vas-Cath v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
97. 545 F.3d 943, 951 (2008). Going forward, the Federal Circuit requires examiners to
look for meaningful limits on process claim scope and distinguish between significant and
insignificant pre- or post-solution activity. Id. at 961, 965.
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VI. EXAMINATION REFORM
Today, patent examination is fundamentally decentralized.
Examiners have enormous discretion about how they perform their
mission. The most significant general directive is that examiners
should avoid piecemeal examination. The policy of compact prosecution states: "The examiner ordinarily should reject each claim on all
valid grounds available, avoiding, however, undue multiplication of
references.""8 This policy is complemented by a culture in which "all
patents are created equal" 9' 9 and an incentive system that favors
speed and customer satisfaction. 0
In this environment, the PTO has not thought creatively about
how to deploy its scarce resources to improve examination outcomes.
To its credit, the agency has responded to particular substantive
controversies in patent law and issued examination guidelines to
guide both examiners and applicants. 10 1 And as I mentioned above,
Community Patent Review is a clever experiment that may improve
prior art search,1'0 and the Second Pair of Eyes Review program
directs extra resources to examination of business method
patents. 0 3 Otherwise, not much has been done to tailor examination.
I can think of four dimensions along which the PTO might
usefully tailor patent examination: (1) the expected value of examining a particular patent; (2) the technology or industry of the invention; (3) a particular patentability standard; and (4) examination
tasks such as prior art search, claim construction, and evaluation
for compliance with patentability standards. I will briefly consider
each in turn.

98. See MPEP, supra note 29, § 707.07(g).
99. Merges, supra note 8, at 597.
100. See supranotes 71-81 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., MPEP, supra note 29, § 2106, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web.
offices/padmpep/mpep-e8r6_2100.pdf (guidelines pertaining to the patentability of software);
id. § 2107 (application of the utility requirement); id. § 2141 (application of the nonobviousness requirement); id. § 2163 (application of the written description requirement).
102. See supra note 14.
103. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
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Because relatively few patents are ever licensed, litigated, or
even asserted, tremendous gains could be realized if the PTO could
identify valuable patents early in prosecution and devote most of
their resources to those patents. The trick, of course, is to determine
at an early stage which patents are valuable. Litigated patents are
a subset of valuable patents, and research shows that litigated
patents differ significantly from nonlitigated patents. For example,
litigated patents have more claims, more citations to prior art, and
are more likely to be part of a family of patents claiming priority
from a common predecessor. 1 4 Perhaps the PTO should devote more
resources to the examination of applications with these characteristics. It should not be too hard to implement, but it is not clear that
this policy would have much value. Strategic prosecutors could
avoid more intense examination by limiting the number of claims,
citations, and family size, 1 5 and even without strategic prosecution,
these sorts of indicators are likely to miss most valuable patents.
A possibly more reliable approach would sort patent applications
based on applicants' choices. The PTO is studying whether applicants should have the option to defer examination.0 6 Applicants
with patents with less expected value could retain their priority
date but defer examination, save PTO examination resources, and
avoid prosecution costs if the applicant later learns the expected
patent value is too low to justify further prosecution. Another
proposal getting serious attention is to let applicants with high expected value opt into a "gold-plated" patent examination system.'0 7
Lichtman and Lemley would eliminate the clear and convincing
evidence presumption of patent validity for normal examination but

104. See Allison et al., supra note 59, at 456-59.
105. There may not be much harm to the prosecutor from citing less prior art. Allison and
Lemley find that the amount of prior art cited is not correlated with validity. John R. Allison
& Mark A. Lemley, EmpiricalEvidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J.
185,230-31 (1998). There could be an indirect advantage from encouraging smaller family size
and fewer claims. But it probably makes more sense to achieve this benefit directly by
imposing an appropriate fee structure or directly regulating these attributes.
106. See Stephen Albainy-Jenei, Patent Barristas, http://www.patentbaristas.coml
archives/2009/01/30/deferred-examination-does-putting-things-off-lesson-your-workload (Jan.
30, 2009).
107. Mark Lemley, Doug Lichtman & Bhaven Sampat, What To Do About Bad Patents?,
28 REG. 10, 12-13 (2005).

706

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:675

retain it for patents that undergo more rigorous examination.1 8
They recognize incentive problems that exist in the PTO and warn
that examiners in the gold-plated unit "should not be paid based
on the number of patents reviewed or (worse) approved, nor should
their tenure turn on 'customer' satisfaction, given that patent
applicants all clearly want just one thing."'1 9 The value of either of
the schemes is unclear--one reason is that we do not have good
evidence that patent applicants are well informed about the value
of their potential patents at the date of application." 0
Besides linking examination policy to some measure of the
expected value of an application, the PTO can link examination to
the technology class of the invention or the industry in which the
patent is likely to be used. This is precisely the sort of tailoring
embraced in the SPER program."' This kind of tailoring also occurs
as the byproduct of patent jurisprudence on utility and subject
matter. On its face, the utility standard is technology neutral, but
in practice the utility standard is usually an issue for only chemical
inventions." 2 Thus, examiners in other technology classes will
rarely need to pause to examine an application for compliance with
the utility requirement. Most of the controversy today about subject matter concerns software and business method inventions.
Examiners reviewing other types of technology are not likely to
issue a rejection based on subject matter. Burk and Lemley argue
that a path out of the current "patent crisis" requires the courts to
apply patent law in a technology-specific fashion, but they do not see
much of a role for the PTO in this endeavor."' They worry that
tailored examination will invite harmful public choice problems and
that the agency does not have the needed policy-relevant information to tailor examination." 4 I see merit to these criticisms as
applied to SPER and subject matter tests in the PTO (though I am
not persuaded), but they do not have much force when applied to the
108. Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 24, at 60-61.
109. Id. at 69.
110. Another reason is that it is not clear that sorting onprivate patent value is a good way
to reduce the expected social cost of examination errors.
111. See Allison & Hunter, supra note 64, at 734.
112. See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 532 (1966).
113. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 33, at 167-68.
114. Id. at 168.
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passive tailoring involving the utility standard. If a public choice
problem exists it is in the courts, and patent examiners should have
access to the information they need to successfully apply the utility
standard to chemical inventions.
The third dimension of tailoring takes me back to the beginning
of this Article. The PTO could tailor examination by departing from
the default position of treating all patentability standards as equal.
It might be true that certain standards are relatively easy to apply
in the PTO. Or it might be true that mistakes involving certain
standards cause greater expected social cost. Then we would want
examiners to pay special attention to the easy or important standards.
Suppose, for sake of illustration, we want to reform examination
to minimize the risk of mistakes concerning patent scope.115 Perhaps
this goal could be advanced by instructing examiners to devote more
time to review of compliance with the enablement standard (at the
cost of time devoted to other standards). There is a plausible argument that examiners have a comparative advantage in reviewing
this standard because technical questions are prominent. The
Federal Circuit indicated that enablement is not satisfied if undue
experimentation is required before a person of ordinary skill in the
art can practice the invention.11 6 Undue experimentation is judged
by reference to the following, mostly technical, factors:
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of
direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of
working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state
of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the
predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth
of the claims.117
115. The best case for this policy might be that the greatest social cost arises from too
broad examination errors, and rigorous examination for enablement is an effective way to
reduce the frequency of these types of mistakes. Seymore advocates adoption of a "prima facie
case of nonenablement for patent applications in the unpredictable arts." Seymore, supra note
42, at 154.
116. See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988); MPEP, supra note 29, § 2164.01,
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep-e8r6_21OO.pdf.
117. In re Wands, 858 F.2d at 737. The initial burden is on the examiner to show lack of
enablement even if there is no evidence that the invention works; the examiner must provide
references to support an enablement rejection. See Seymore, supra note 42, at 141.
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The comparative advantage of examiners is strengthened because
third parties often cannot test enablement after a patent grant
without running the risk of an infringement suit."'
Such a policy could face implementation obstacles at both the
agency and examiner level. Possibly this reform would reduce
average patent value or increase patent prosecution costs, causing
harm to certain patent holders and the patent bar. These parties
may be able to subvert such a reform unless the PTO is better
sheltered from their influence, perhaps by funding the agency out
of general federal revenue. Regarding examiners, the agency would
need to better train and retain examiners with the technical skills
necessary to evaluate enablement questions and other questions
bearing on proper patent scope. Senior examiners should be rewarded for improving the examination of scope questions and
training junior examiners to do the same." 9 In addition, financial
incentives could be provided by conducting audits that measure
enablement error rates using court proceedings, reexaminations, or
outside expert review."2 °
The final dimension for examination reform is in terms of
examination tasks. Community Patent Review is an example of a
reform designed to improve prior art search. This sort of reform
could be implemented for any sort of technology, but in its current
form, it is targeted at software patents. Bessen and Meurer argue
that patent examiners should direct more effort to improving the
clarity of patent scope, by rejecting more claims on grounds of
indefiniteness and by creating a richer administrative record about
how the examiner and applicant parse claim language. 2 ' Again, this
sort of reform could be targeted toward certain technologies or
industries that are especially plagued by fuzzy patent claims such
as information and communications technologies.' 2 2

118. Seymore, supra note 42, at 150. But see Kieff, supranote 8, at 102-04 (arguing that
patent applicants have incentives to "keep their own patent scope 'just right' from a social
perspective").
119. Merges, supra note 8, at 607 (stating that senior examiners are not rewarded for
training junior examiners); see also Lemley & Sampat, supra note 77, at 21-22.
120. See Merges, supra note 8, at 609.
121. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 48, at 239-40.
122. See id. at 152-54.
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CONCLUSION

Rob Merges recognized a critical question of patent policy: "how
thorough should patent examinations be?" 123 Some scholars have
argued that the current level of scrutiny is appropriate because
costs can be saved by delaying intense review until litigation.'2 4
to be improved
Others have argued the quality of examination needs
125
patents.
quality
low
by
caused
harms
to alleviate
My tack in this Article is different. Assuming total effort is fixed,
I ask how examiner effort should be allocated across patent applications, examination tasks, and patentability standards. Perhaps I
have short-changed the reader because I do not strongly advocate a
particular examination reform. Instead, I explain how patent
examination priorities should be set-I have identified policy issues
that must be addressed, and I have commented in passing about the
paucity of empirical research relevant to setting an optimal examination policy.
Good patent examination policy requires more empirical research.
Researchers need to learn more about patterns of examination
error, about strategic responses to examination policy, about the
opportunity costs of various examination tasks, and much more. ,The
PTO should facilitate this research by gathering, analyzing, and
disseminating more data about how examination works (and does
not work). Perhaps, the agency's recent willingness to experiment
with Community Patent Review signals a new era of more imaginative policy formulation and closer cooperation with academic
researchers.

123. Merges, supra note 8,at 591.
124. See generally Kieff, supra note 8; Lemley, supra note 8.
125. See Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives To Challenge and Defend Patents:
Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errorsand Why AdministrativePatentReview
Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 948 (2004) (arguing that "litigation is an unreliable
tool for assessing patent validity" because successful defense is a public good that will be
underprovided and the patentee may care more about the outcome because of pass-through
problems); Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why "Bad" Patents Survive in the Market and
How Should We Change?-The Privateand Social Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61, 71
(2006) ("Our empirical data on dual invalidation processes in Japan from 2000-2003
demonstrate that there are sound economic and institutional reasons for maintaining the
ability to raise patent validity challenges in both the Patent Office and the courts.").

